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I.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ADDRESSED
(1). Were the substantial rights of Edwards prejudiced by the Hearing Officer’s
actions?
(2). Is Edwards entitled to an award of costs and attorney’s fees?
II.
ARGUMENT
The various assertions made in the Department’s Response Brief will be
addressed in the order they appear in such Brief.
First, the Department asserts that Edwards’ argues that the disqualification was
improper because he was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of the offenses.
(Respondent’s Brief, p. 7). This is not Mr. Edwards’ argument at all. The significance of
the fact that Mr. Edwards did not commit any of the offenses at issue while operating a
commercial vehicle is twofold. A person who is operating a commercial vehicle under the
influence versus operating a commercial vehicle while not under the influence has legal
significance. It changes the characterization of the offender’s actions, which potentially
affects the penalties an offender is subject to. Also, this distinction affects the manner in
which the offender’s actions are perceived, relative to the principal rationale of Idaho’s
statutory scheme, namely, to keep intoxicated driver’s from operating large trucks on the
roadway, creating an increased risk to the public. In short, any emphasis placed on the
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Mr. Edwards was not operating a commercial vehicle while under the inﬂuence

fact that

is critical

to addressing these

two

points.

Second, the Department admits in

its

Brieﬁng

that

“CDL drivers will

lose their

CDL for conviction 0f a DUI and/or a motorist’s refusal to submit to evidentiary testing
or failing such testing.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.

8).

This serves to buttress Mr. Edwards’

argument. Mr. Edwards maintains that his disqualiﬁcations caused the loss 0f his

CDL,

not simply the privileges associated therewith. The Department’s statement, cited above,
certainly

seems

to support

what Mr. Edwards has long

Third, the Department relies

application to the present case

112,

(Ct.

320 P.3d 1271

upon two case

— Peck v.

State,

citations, neither

of Which has any

Department 0f Transportation, 156 Idaho

App. 2014) and Williams

(Ct.

asserted.

v.

ITD, 153 Idaho 380, 283 P.3d 127

App. 2012). In Peck, the claims asserted by Peck were

that (1) his procedural

due

process rights were violated because he was not given notice of the disqualiﬁcation
provisions 0f I.C. § 49-335; therefore, his evidentiary testing

was performed without

implied consent, Violating his constitutional right t0 be free from unreasonable search and
seizure;

rights

that

and

(2) the disqualiﬁcation

CDL violated his substantive

was not already accomplished through

of his

due process

because the disqualiﬁcation bore no rational relationship t0 a legislative purpose

hand, Williams asserted

him

0f his

CDL was

to multiple

(2), that I.C. §

that, (1) despite

the

being

ALS

suspension. In Williams on the other

civil in nature, the lifetime disqualiﬁcation

so punitive as t0 effectively be a criminal penalty and thus subjecting

punishments and convictions in Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause;

18-8002

is

unconstitutional as applied to

doctrine because the statute failed to inform

him

him under the void-for-Vagueness

that a failed breath test

would

affect his

CDL;

(3) that the

ITD

violated his substantive due process rights as his lifetime

disqualiﬁcation bore no rational relationship t0 the legislative objective of I.C. § 49—335;

and

(4) that his lifetime

either

CDL disqualiﬁcation was/is so punitive that it is the equivalent to

an excessive ﬁne or cruel and unusual punishment, or both.

None of these

claims have been asserted by Mr. Edwards in the case at bar.

Furthermore, none of these cases ever attempted to answer the question 0f When a person
ceases to be considered the “holder” of a
cases cited above.

The two cases

CDL,

as that issue

was never raised

in the

two

of providing assistance

therefore, are valueless in terms

t0 deciding the issues raised in the present case.

Fourth, the Department asserts that

shift

from a

it

takes positive action

CDL driver to a non-CDL driver,

giving up the

CDL. (Respondent’s

Brief, pp. 13-14).

authority to back this proposition, and

physical surrender of one’s

such as going to the

it is

Department makes

DMV and physically

The Department

offers

n0

legal

CDL would leave a driver Without even a Class D license.

later in its

privileges but not the license,

disqualiﬁed

CDL holder t0

doubtful that any exists. Moreover, the

Additionally, the idea of physically surrendering the

the

by the

CDL contradicts the very argument

Brief that disqualiﬁcation only affects the

and that nothings needs to be done

CDL except to wait out the disqualiﬁcation period.

CDL

t0 reinstate a

If

only the

CDL

“privileges” are affected, not the license, and one only need to wait for the

disqualiﬁcation period to expire, then

making a

trip to the

of

DMV and having to get a new physical license at the end of the

disqualiﬁcation period? Moreover,

scheme.

why would anyone go through the trouble

it is

helpful to think in terms 0f the

DUI

statutory

A driver in a non-CDL DUI setting is not required to surrender their physical

license, despite say, an adverse ALS ruling sustaining the suspension; why then would a
person with a CDL, having also received an adverse ruling, have to turn in the physical
license even though the license is inherently invalid? And finally, the question arises, if
the physical license is surrendered, does this impose upon the driver additional
requirements at the end of the disqualification period, such as applying for a brand new
CDL as if he/she never had one in the first instance? Remember, it is the position of the
Department that one only has to wait out the disqualification period to get reinstatement.
Fifth, the Department attempts to explain away the case of State v. Matalamaki,
139 Idaho 341, 79 P.33d 162 (Ct. App. 2003), which held that, “[I]f the individual’s
driving privileges are revoked, disqualified, or suspended, the individual’s license is
inherently invalid.” However, the Court therein did not differentiate between a Class A
license and a Class D license. The key point is simply whether there was a
disqualification, and the effect thereof.
Sixth, the Department wishes to compare disqualification with revocation,
cancellation and suspension, ultimately coming to the conclusion that, “Unlike
revocation, cancellation, or suspension, a disqualification only withdraws the privilege to
operate a commercial vehicle. Disqualification does not affect the non-commercial
driver’s license. Revocations affect the person’s license or privilege to operate a motor
vehicle; suspensions affect the person’s license or privilege to drive. A disqualification
only affects the privilege to operate a commercial vehicle, not the license.” (Respondent’s
Brief, p15). The Department’s position ignores I.C. § 49-326 which governs the
authority of the Department to suspend, disqualify or revoke driver’s license and
privileges, which provides in part:

6

Upon the hearing, the department shall either rescind its order or, with
good cause, may affirm or extend the suspension or disqualification of the
driver’s license or revoke the driver’s license.
(emphasis added).
Seventh, the Department seeks to discount the application of I.C. § 49-328, 49326 and 49-301(5). With respect to Idaho Code § 49-328, the section provides in
pertinent part that when the period of disqualification of a driver's license has expired, or
the reason for the disqualification or suspension no longer exists, the department shall
reinstate the driver's license or driving privileges on application of the driver. This
section demonstrates that affirmative action must be taken before a license is reinstated.
If the prescribed affirmative steps are not taken, the license will remain disqualified,
meaning it is inherently invalid (as to its Class A status). As to I.C. § 49-326, the statute
governing the authority of the Department to suspend, disqualify or revoke driver’s
license and privileges, the statute provides the Department’s authority, upon hearing, is
limited to, (in relevant part), disqualification of the license. Clearly, the Department’s
stated authority is limited to taking certain actions with respect to the driver’s license, not
simply the “privileges” associated therewith.
Eighth, as previously noted in earlier briefing, the Department wishes to utilize a
“refusal conviction” as a basis for imposing Edwards’ lifetime CDL disqualification. It is
the position of the Department that it is the failure to take the breath test that is the
offense, not the ultimate result of the criminal charge. (Respondent’s Brief, p. 16). This
position is erroneous. Idaho Code § 49-335(4) prescribes in relevant part that a person is
disqualified for the period of time set forth in 49 CFR 383 if found to have committed
two or more of the offenses committed two or more of the offenses specified in
subsection one or two of Idaho Code § 49-335.
7
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CFR 383.51(a)(3)

(3)

A holder of a CLP or CDL is subject to disqualiﬁcation sanctions designated
and

in paragraphs (b)

(c)

in turn provides in part:

of this section,

if the

CMV or non-CMV and is

holder drives a

convicted of the violations listed in those paragraphs. (emphasis added).

And,
(4)

Determining ﬁrst and subsequent Violations. For purposes of determining ﬁrst

and subsequent Violations of the offenses speciﬁed
any offense

listed in

Tables

whether committed in a

CM_V

Both 0f these sections

Under 49
...for

through 4 to

1

0r

in this subpart,

this section resulting

non-CMV, must be

each conviction for

from a separate

incident,

counted.

explicitly refer to a “conviction”.

CFR 383.5 1(b)

If a driver operates a

motor vehicle and

is

convicted of

a second conviction 0r refusal to be tested in a separate incident or any combination

of offenses in

this

Table while operating a

disqualiﬁed from operating a

non-CMV,

a

CLP

or

CDL holder must be

CMV for life, for refusing to take a test for alcohol

concentration. (emphasis added).

Pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 49-104(15)(b), a “conviction” in relevant part,

deﬁned

as

is

an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or determination that a person has violated

0r failed to

comply With

the law.

The Department has

also cited t0 the deﬁnition under

federal law.

Here, Mr. Edwards’ “refusal conviction” was vacated and dismissed

by the

Court.

Thus, there was no refusal conviction (unvacated adjudication 0f guilt), and similarly, no
determination that Mr. Edwards had violated or failed to comply With the law.

Consequently, the refusal cannot be utilized as a basis for imposing Edwards’ lifetime

CDL disqualiﬁcation.
III.

SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF MR. EDWARDS HAVE BEEN PREJUDICED BY

THE HEARING EXAMINER’S ACTIONS.
Idaho Code § 67-5279 requires that that the agency action be afﬁrmed unless
substantial rights 0f the appellant

that

have been prejudiced. Here, there can be no question

Mr. Edwards’ substantial rights have been prejudiced.

Our Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have recognized the importance of one’s
Supreme Court

driving privileges. For example, the

in State

v.

Ankney, 109 Idaho

P.2d 333 (1985), discussing the suspension of Ankney’s driver’s license,

1,

704

said:

Because the suspension of issued driver’s licenses involves state action
of the licensees, licenses may not be
taken away without procedural due process. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105,
97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91
S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971).
that adjudicates important interests

State

v.

Ankney, 109 Idaho

interest affected, the

It is

at 3-4.

Concerning the nature and weight 0f the private

Supreme Court added:

well recognized that an individual's interest in his driver's license

See Mackey

substantial.

v.

Montrym, 443 U.S.

61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979); Dixon

v.

1,

11,

is

99 S.Ct. 2612, 2617,

Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112, 97 S.Ct. 1723,

1727-28, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977).

State

v.

Ankney, 109 Idaho

at 4.

Subsequently, in Matter

ochNeely, 119 Idaho

182, 804

P.2d 911 (Idaho App. 1990), a case involving a McNeely’s driver’s license suspension

under Idaho Code
arrest for

§

18-8002 for the

DUI, the Court 0f Appeals

Suspension of a

failure to

BAC test at the time 0f his

reiterated:

driver's license

state action that adjudicates

submit t0 a

pursuant to the implied consent statute

is

a

important interests of the licensee; the licensee

cannot be divested of this liberty interest Without procedural due process.

See Dixon
State V.

Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977);

v.

Ankney,

supra.

Matter ochNeely, 119 Idaho

McNeely’s

The Court 0f Appeals then elaborated on

at 190.

interest in his driver’s license:

It is

well recognized that an individual's interest in a driver‘s license

substantial.

See Mackey

However, the

v.

Montrym, supra; State

is

Ankney, supra.

licensee's interest is not so substantial as to require a

presuspension hearing, Dixon
28, although

v.

it

may be

v.

Love, 431 U.S. at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 1727-

by the length 0f the suspension period and
Mackey v. Montrym,
2618. Under I.C. § 18-8002, the licensee who

affected

timeliness of a postsuspension review proceeding.

443 U.S.

at 12,

99 S.Ct.

refuses t0 take a

at

BAC test is entitled to a timely postsuspension hearing

within thirty days 0f seizure 0f his 0r her driver's license.

Matter ochNeely, 119 Idaho

at 190. In

Driver’s License Suspension ofPlatz, 154 Idaho

960, 303 P.3d 647 (App. 2013), the Court of Appeals recently afﬁrmed that the

procedural due process rights

owed

in

an

ALS

suspension proceeding, are also

owed

in a

CDL proceeding:
In Bell, 151 Idaho 659,

driver

is

262 P.3d 1030, the Idaho Supreme Court held a
due process because an ALS involves state

entitled t0 procedural

action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. Bell, 151 Idaho
at

664-65, 262 P.3d at 1035-36 (citing Dixon

v.

Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112,

m

97 S.Ct. 1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, 179-80 (1977); State v. Ankney,
1, 3-4, 704 P.2d 333, 335-36 (1985); In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937,
945, 155 P.3d 1176, 1184 (Ct.App.2006)). We conclude that the same

Idaho

rights attach relative t0 a

CDL proceeding.

Driver's License Suspension ofPlatz, 154 Idaho at 960, 303 P.3d 647 (App. 2013).
In the present case, Mr. Edwards’ interest in his

commercial

driver's license is

very substantial. Mr. Edwards” commercial driving privileges stand t0 be suspended for
life

should the Department’s wrongful license disqualiﬁcation be upheld. Clearly, for the

reasons outlined above, the erroneous deprivation 0f Mr. Edwards' commercial driving

privileges,

upon which Mr. Edwards

relies

0n

10

for his livelihood in the trucking industry,

prejudices a very substantial right.
IV.
MR. EDWARDS IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES.
I.A.R. 40 addresses an award of costs under appropriate circumstances. It states in
pertinent part:
(a) Costs to Prevailing Party. With the exception of postconviction appeals and appeals from proceedings involving the
termination of parental rights or an adoption, costs shall be allowed
as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise
provided by law or order of the Court.
I.C. § 12-117 delineates those circumstances in which attorney’s fees shall be
awarded. It states:
12-117 ATTORNEY’S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND
ESPENSES AWARDED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES. (1) Unless
otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a
person, the state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing
the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing
party reasonable attorney’s fees witness fees and other reasonable
expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
I.A.R. 41 discusses some of the particulars involved in requesting an award of
attorney fees on appeal, thus solidifying the conclusion that an award of attorney fees on
appeal may be appropriate and available in certain instances.
In the instant case, costs should awarded to Mr. Edwards should the Court
determine he is the prevailing party. Additionally, Mr. Edwards should be awarded his
attorney’s fees, assuming he is the prevailing party, as the Department acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law, as is apparent in Mr. Edwards’ briefing to this Court.
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V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Edwards respectfully requests that the decision of
the Hearing Examiner be overturned and Mr. Edwards’ lifetime commercial driver’s
license disqualification be vacated, and he be awarded his reasonable costs and attorney’s
fees.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2019.

/s/ R.D. Watson_________
R.D. Watson
Attorney for Bruce A. Edwards
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